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Abstract 
Modern capital structure theory started in 1958, when Modigliani and Miller （1958）(M&M hereafter) first 
brought out “Capital Structure Irrelevance Theory”, advocated that the firm value and weighted average cost of 
capital (WACC) is unaffected by the financial structure of the firm. The goal in this paper is to analyze whether 
leverage affects firm value for a panel of Persian listed companies during the period 2009 to 2015.. ROA, ROE, 
EPS and Tobing’s q are adopted as proxy variables for firm value. The result shows that there exists single 
threshold effect between debt ratio and firm value only when Tobing’s q is selected as the proxy variable for the 
firm value. The estimated threshold value (γ ) is found to be 37.84% and two coefficients (
1α and 2α ) are all 
positive with the evidence that the 
1α  in the low debt level is significant, while the 2α  in the high debt level is 
not. Advanced panel threshold regression model is performed to test if there exists an “optimal” debt ratio , 
which may result in threshold effects and asymmetrical relationships between debt ratio and firm value 
Keywords: panel threshold regression model, Tobin’s q, Firm Value, Capital Structure 
 
Introduction  
The extension of M&M and Miller’s model is the trade off theory between the tax advantage of debt and various 
leverage-related costs (such as debt-issuing costs, bankruptcy costs, agency costs, and loss of non-debt tax 
shields). Direct bankruptcy costs include the costs that are associated with bankruptcy, such as legal and 
administrative costs. In addition, though borrowing saves a firm’s money on its corporate taxes, but the more a 
firm borrows, the firm increases its risk causing the firm’s bond rating to decrease, and its costs of debt to 
increase. The more likely it is that the firm becomes bankrupt and finally even has to pay the “bankruptcy tax”. 
Indirect bankruptcy costs include the difficulties of running a business that is experiencing financial distress. 
Moreover, Jensen and Meckling (1976) specified the existence of “agency costs” which arise due to the conflicts 
either between managers and shareholders (agency costs of equity) or between shareholders and debtholders 
(agency costs of debt). 
Modern capital structure theory started in 1958, when Modigliani and Miller （1958）(M&M hereafter) 
first brought out “Capital Structure Irrelevance Theory”, advocated that the firm value and weighted average cost 
of capital (WACC) is unaffected by the financial structure of the firm. However, M&M’s perfect market 
assumptions: such as no transaction costs, no taxes, symmetric information and identical borrowing rates, and 
risk free debt, are contradictory to the operations in the real world. Modigliani and Miller (1963) later modified 
their original M&M’s model and considered the tax deductibility of interest (tax shields effect). According to 
modified M&M theory with taxes, value of levered firm equals the value of un-levered plus the value of the tax 
shields. In this case, the more the debt in the capital structure, the higher will be the value of a levered firm. One 
can always increase firm value by increasing leverage, implying a capital structure of 100% debt is optimal to 
maximize the firm’s value. Miller (1977) further added personal taxes to the analysis and demonstrated that tax 
deductibility of interest at the firm level is offset by personal income taxes at the investor level. 
 
Review of Literature 
In the Static Tradeoff Theory (Myers, 1977) there is a static or balance amount of debt and equity for the 
manager to decide, by analyzing the trade-off between the benefits of more debt versus the cost of additional 
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debt in the form of financial distress or agency costs. Ultimately, finds the “optimal capital structure”. This 
theory suggests that value-maximizing financial managers should employ capital structures composed of that 
mix of debt and equity for which the interest tax shield is equal to the incremental costs through debt financing. 
Kim and Sorensen (1986) investigated the presence of the agency costs and their relation to the debt policy of 
corporations. It is found that firms with higher insider ownership have greater debt ratios than firms with lower 
insider ownership, which may be explained by the agency costs of debt or the agency costs of equity. It is also 
found that high-growth firms use less debt rather than more debt, high-operating-risk firms use more debt rather 
than less debt, and firm size seems to be uncorrelated to the level of debt.  
Ross (1977) applied the “Incentive Signaling Approach” to the determination of financial structure. 
This asymmetric information signaling model posited different levels of information between insiders (managers) 
and outsiders (investors). It claimed that an increase of leverage conveys “positive” news, implying the firm's 
capability to service a larger amount of debt, which in turn increase the firm’s value.   
The relationship between capital structure and firm value has been the subject of considerable debate 
throughout the literature. There are two issues to discuss: 1. Whether there is an optimal capital structure for an 
individual firm; 2. Whether the proportion of debt usage is irrelevant to the individual firm’s value. Castanias 
(1983) emphasized the possibility of bankruptcy has a negative effect on the value of the firm. As the proportion 
of debt in the firm’s capital structure is increased, the probability of bankruptcy also increases. Consequently, the 
rate of return required by bondholders increases with leverage. The optimal ratio of debt to equity is determined 
by taking an increasing amount of debt until the marginal gain from leverage is equal to the marginal expected 
loss from the bankruptcy costs. Altman (1984) compared the present value of expected bankruptcy costs with the 
present value of expected tax benefits from interest payments on leverage, and concluded that the potential 
impact of bankruptcy costs on firm valuation and capital structure issues is very important. Jensen (1986) 
emphasized the agency conflicts between top managers and shareholders. These conflicts are especially severe in 
firms with “large” free cash flows－more cash than profitable investment opportunities. Top managers may 
waste cash on organization inefficiencies or invest it at the projects that the net present value (NPV) of them is 
small than zero. In this case, increasing of debt levels lower free cash flows, consequently increase the value of 
firms. Leland and Toft (1996) pointed out the use of long-term debt financing, though generates more tax 
benefits, which may also increases the degree of the firm’s bankruptcy and agency costs. Therefore, they argued 
that using short-term debt reduces agency conflicts, thus reducing the associated degree of risk.  
With respect to finding the optimal capital structure, Philosophov and Philosophov (1999) developed a 
probabilistic approach to the problem of optimization of corporate capital structure. The approach enables 
quantitative assessment of optimal Debt/Equity ratio, and includes calculation of probability of corporate 
bankruptcy in the future as a function of the time interval remaining until the bankruptcy. The probability is then 
used in a modified formula of discount share valuation to calculate the share or value of a corporation. In 
addition, modern “dynamic” capital structure model (Goldstein, Ju and Leland, 1998), extending “static” tradeoff 
models, simulated an optimal capital structure by Monte Carlo approach. Most traditional capital structure 
models assume that the decision of how much debt to issue is a static choice. In practice, however, firms adjust 
outstanding debt levels in response to changes in firm value. The study demonstrated the optimal strategy of a 
firm when it has the option to increase debt levels in the future. Due to the target debt ratio changes over time, 
and implying reversion to previous debt levels. In particular, companies investigated the contingent cash flows 
for arbitrary capital structure strategies, and managers choose the one that maximizing current shareholders’ 
wealth.  
Contradictory to Tradeoff Models, the Pecking Order Model (Myers and Majluf, 1984) emphasized 
asymmetric information between managers and outside investors, and predicts external debt financing driven by 
the internal financial deficit but not interest tax shield benefit. Since the managers have the information that the 
outside investors do not have, and they make decisions usually based upon the objective of maximizing the 
profits of shareholders, they possibly will refuse issuing new shares of stock (equity) and debts, and prefer 
internal financing. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) further demonstrated the moving of the capital structure or 
the changes in debt ratios are driven by the need for external funds, not by any attempt to reach an optimal 
capital structure. It is the result of the financial hierarchy, which descends from internal funds (retained earnings), 
to debt (safe debt, risky debt), to external equity. In particular, a firm that realizes a reduction in value because of 
very poor profits may become more highly levered because of a reluctance to issue new equity. However, 
Chirinko and Singha (2000) specifically made a critical comment to Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), and 
considered their simple test and conclusions generated misleading inferences when evaluating “plausible” 
patterns of external financing.  
There are a few papers studied the determinants of the choice of capital structure. Bradley, et al. (1984) 
developed a model that synthesizes the modern balancing theory of optimal capital structure and incorporates: 1. 
positive personal taxes on equity and on bond income, 2. expected costs of financial distress, and 3. positive non-
debt tax shields. Using simulation analysis, the results indicated that firm leverage ratios will be negatively 
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related to the volatility of firm earnings if the costs of financial distress are nontrivial. The analysis also showed 
strong industry influences exist across firm leverage ratios. Concern is raised whether focusing on leverage ratios 
is the best way to uncover the determinants of capital structure. Castanias (1983) finds that ex ante default costs 
are large enough to induce the typical firm to hold an optimum mix of debt and equity. Titman and Wessels 
(1988) conducted analysis of measures of short-term, long-term, and convertible debt instead of an aggregate 
measure of total debt. It was found that debt levels are related negatively to the "uniqueness" of a firm's line of 
business. The results further indicated short-term debt ratios were demonstrated to be related negatively to firm 
size. 
 Morellec (2001) investigated the impact of asset liquidity on the valuation of corporate securities and 
the firm’s financing decisions. The empirical studies showed that asset liquidity increases debt capacity only 
when bond covenants restrict the disposition of assets. However, with unsecured debt, greater liquidity increases 
credit spreads on corporate debt and reduces optimal leverage. The model also determined the extent to which 
pledging assets increases firm value. Lie (2002) investigated whether companies use self-tender offers to 
optimize their capital structure. The debt ratios of the firms around the offers, are compared with predicted debt 
ratios by static trade-off model. The results showed that self-tender offers undertaken to defend against takeovers 
reach a debt ratio that reduces the probability that the firm will be acquired; while non-defensive self-tender 
offers reach an optimal debt ratio. However, to effectively deter takeovers, the debt ratio may have to be higher 
than optimal as predicted by the static trade-off model, in which tax benefits are traded off against financial 
distress costs. Bergman and Callen (1991) found out when a company’s ratio of intangible assets to total assets 
increases, the debt ratio appears to become relatively lower. Debt ratio is related negatively to growth of 
intangible assets. Burgman (1996) examined unique factors that may help explain the capital structure choice of 
multinational corporations (MNCs). The results suggested that specific international factors such as political risk 
and exchange rate risk are relevant to the capital structure decision, that multinationals have higher agency costs 
than purely domestic firms, and that international diversification does not lower earnings volatility for MNCs.     
Taiwan, a typical island-style export-led country, is a main supplier of electronics and Information-
Technology (IT) related products to the U.S. and the rest of the world. Taiwanese economy is now relies more 
on capital-intensive goods than ever. Among different industries, Whiting (1991) pointed out that the weighted 
average debt as a percentage of total capital within the electronic industry is higher than within other type of 
industries. Therefore it is worth exploring the effect of the use of financial leverage on firm value of electronics 
companies in Iran.  
Aiming at investigating whether application of financial leverage affects corporate performance or firm 
value of electronic listed firms in Taiwan, we apply threshold regression model to the observed “balanced panel 
data” to test if there exists an optimal Debt/Total Assets ratio (D/TA ratio hereafter) which may result in 
threshold effect and asymmetrical responses of the corporate performance to the D/TA ratio. If this “threshold” 
value of γ  is verified, the financial managers should take steps to increase debt levels in the low debt regime of 
D/TA ratio lower than the γ . Conversely, they should take steps to reduce debt levels in the high debt regime of 
D/TA ratio higher than γ .  
This paper contributes to previous literature in four aspects. First, we apply advanced panel threshold 
regression model developed by Hansen (1999) to test if there exists a “threshold” of optimal debt usage. In 
contrast with traditional linear model, this nonlinear threshold model can describes the “trade-off” between the 
benefits of tax shields of more debts and the disadvantages of costs from additional debts that may damage the 
corporate performance or value. Second, we consider panel data of listed companies to fully examine the 
financial characteristics of the electronic industry and to solve the short period sample problem. Third, we use 
both accounting measurements of ROA, ROE and EPS and Tobin’s q to serve as proxies for firm value. Finally, 
four related control variables are considered to make our nonlinear function form more persuadable.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section II describes the selected variables and data. 
Methodologies are introduced Section III. Section IV presents and analyzes the empirical results. Section V 
concludes this paper. 
 
Data Description 
This paper explores if there exists an optimal D/TA ratio, which may result in threshold effect and asymmetrical 
responses of the firm value to the D/TA ratio through employing threshold regression model. The investigation 
has been performed using “balanced panel data” for a sample of 20 selected companies listed on the Tehran 
Stock Exchange. A total of 200 observations are adopted for each variable considered. For the firm value, we 
choose accounting financial ratios: Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE), Earnings Per Share (EPS) 
as the indicators or proxy variables to evaluate the corporate performance or firm value. Besides, in order to 
consider the effect of market valuation of a firm, Tobing’s q, which defined as the ratio of the market value of a 
firm to the replacement cost of its assets, is also selected as the proxy variable for the firm performance or value. 
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The calculations of the approximated q, following the suggestions by Chung and Pruitt (1994), is defined as 
follows: 
Approximated q = (MVE + PS + DEBT)/TA, 
where MVE is the product of a firm's share price and the number of common stock shares outstanding, 
PS is the liquidating value of the firm's outstanding preferred stock, DEBT is the value of the firm's short-term 
liabilities net of its short-term assets, plus the book value of the firm's long-term debt, and TA is the book value 
of the total assets of the firm.  There are two categories of explanatory variables in our panel data examination. 
The first is the threshold variable, which is the key variable to be investigated whether there exists an 
asymmetric threshold effect of the financial leverage on firm value. The debt to total assets ratio (D/TA Ratio) is 
selected as the indicator for the debt usage of the firms since it is widely used in the literature. Second category 
of explanatory variable is the control variables, which we adopt to make our function form more persuadable. In 
this paper, four control variables, including dividend payout ratio, management ownership ratio, growth rate of 
total assets, and switch-out investment ratio, which are presumed to have influences upon the firm value, are 
applied in our examination.  
 
Methodologies 
1. Panel Unit Root Models 
Hansen’s (1999) panel threshold regression model is in fact an extension of the traditional least squared 
estimation method. It requires that variables considered in the model need to be stationary in order to avoid the 
so-called spurious regression. We thus process the unit root test in our first step. Since the data are all panel in 
our investigation, both well known LLC (Levin, Lin and Chu, 2001) and IPS (Im, Pesaran and Shin, 1997) 
techniques are employed for the panel unit root tests. 
 The result of the stationary test for each panel (explained variables, threshold variable, and control 
variables) shows that all the variables are most likely to be presumed to carry stationary characteristics since the 
null of unit root are mostly rejected, especially in the findings from LLC test. These stationary findings enable us 
to go further estimations of the panel threshold regression.     
 
2. Threshold Autoregressive Model 
Modern dynamic capital structure model proposed an idea of finding the “target” optimal debt ratio and firms 
will adjust outstanding debt levels in response to changes in firm value. This paper applies a newly-developed, 
alternative method: panel threshold regression model to solve this problem, to strike a “balance” between the tax 
benefit and the potential costs that comes along with this benefit. Since Tong (1978) proposed Threshold 
Autoregressive model, thereafter, this non-linear time series model has become very popular for economic and 
financial research.  
When the Threshold Autoregressive Model is estimated, first we should test if there exists threshold 
effects. If we can not reject the null hypothesis, the threshold effect doesn’t exist. Again, the existence of 
nuisance will make the testing statistic follow non-standard distribution, which was called “Davies’ Problem. 
Hansen (1999) suggested a “bootstrap” method to compute the asymptotic distribution of testing statistics in 
order to test the significance of threshold effect. Furthermore, when the null hypothesis doesn’t hold, which 
means, the threshold effect does exist, Chan (1993) proved that OLS estimation of threshold is super consistent, 
the asymptotic distribution is derived. However, nuisance influences this distribution and makes it non-standard. 
Hansen (1999) used simulation likelihood ratio test to derive the asymptotic distribution of testing statistic for a 
threshold. 
Hansen (1999) proposed to use two-stage OLS method to estimate the panel threshold model. On the 
first stage, for any given threshold )(γ , compute the sum of square errors (SSR) separately. On the second stage, 
try to find the estimation of $( )γ  by minimization of the sum of squares. At last, use the estimation of threshold 
to estimate the coefficient for every “regime” and do analysis. 
  
2.1 Threshold Model Construction 
According to the “Tradeoff Theory” of Capital Structure, when debt ratio increases, the interest tax shield 
increases; however, on the other side, leverage related costs increase to offset the positive effect of debt ratio to 
the firm value. Thus, this paper aims at examining whether threshold effect exists between the financial leverage 
and firm’s performance or value. We assume that there exists an optimal D/TA ratio, and try to use threshold 
model to estimate this ratio, which can capture the relationship between financial leverage and firm performance 
as well as help financial managers make decisions. 
 
Thus we set up single threshold model as follows: 
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Where itv  represents proxy variables of the firm value, which are ita : ROA, ite :  ROE， itp : EPS, 
itq : Tobin’s q; itd , D/TA ratio, which is also the threshold variable,; γ , the specific estimated threshold value. 
There are four “control variables”( ith ) that they may have influences upon the firm value, which are 
its : stock dividend per share, itm : management ownership ratio, itg : growth rate of total assets, itc : long-term 
investment ratio. Besides, iµ , the fixed effect, represents the heterogeneity of companies under different 
operating conditions; The errors itε  is assumed to be independent and identically distributed with mean zero and 
finite variance
2σ ( 2~ (0, )it iidε σ ); i represents different companies; t represents different periods. 
Another threshold regression model of (1) is to set: 
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The observations are divided into two “regimes” depending on whether the threshold variable itd  is 
smaller or larger than the threshold value( γ ). The regimes are distinguished by differing regression 
slopes, 1α and 2α . We will use known itv  and itd  to estimate the parameters (γ , α , θ ,and 
2σ ). 
 
2.2 Estimation 
Note that taking averages of (3) over the time index t to derive: 
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Taking the difference between (3) and (4) yields: 
  
***
)( ititit dv εγα +′=                                               (5) 
where iitit vvv −=
* ， )()()(* γγγ iitit ddd −= ， and iitit εεε −=*  
Let 
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Use this notation, (5) is equivalent to  
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The equation (6) represents the major estimation model of threshold effect. For any given γ , the slope 
coefficient α  can be estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS). That is,  
   ( ) ( ) 1* * * *ˆ ( ) ( ) ( )D D D Vα γ γ γ γ−′=                                 (7) 
The vector of regression residuals is  
 )(ˆ)()(ˆ *** γαγγ DVe −=                                          (8) 
and the sum of squared errors, SSE is  
**1******
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Chan(1993) and Hansen (1999) recommend estimation of γ  by lease squares. This is easier to achieve 
by minimization of the concentrated sum of squared errors (9). Hence the least squares estimators of γ  is  
 )(minargˆ 1 γγ SSE=                                             (10) 
Once γˆ is obtained, the slope coefficient estimate is ( )ˆ ˆ ˆα α γ= . The residual vector is ( )* *ˆ ˆ ˆe e γ= ， and the 
estimator of residual variance is 
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where n indexes the number of sample, T indexed the periods of sample. 
 
2.3 Testing for a threshold 
This paper hypothesizes that there exists threshold effect between the D/TA ratio and firm value. It is important 
to determine whether the threshold effect is statistically significant. The null hypothesis and alternative 
hypothesis can be represented as follows: 



≠
=
211
210
:
:
αα
αα
H
H
 
When the null hypothesis holds, the coefficient 1α = 2α the threshold effect doesn’t exist. When the 
alternative hypothesis holds, the coefficient 1α ≠ 2α  the threshold effect exists between the D/TA ratio and firm 
value. 
Under the null hypothesis of no threshold, the model is  
  ( )it i it it itv u h dθ α γ ε′ ′= + + +                                    (12) 
After the fixed-effect transformation is made, we have 
  
* * *
1it it itV H eα ′= +                                               (13) 
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The regression parameter is estimated by OLS, yielding estimate 1α% , residuals
*~e  and sum of squared 
errors
*/*
0
~~ eeSSE = .  
Hansen (1999) suggests that we use the F Test Approach to test the existence of threshold effect, and 
use the sup-Wald statistic to test the null hypothesis.  
  )(sup γFF =                                                  (14) 
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Under the null hypothesis, some coefficients (e.g. the pre-specified threshold γ ) do not exist, therefore, 
the nuisance exists. According to “Davies’ problem” (1977,1987), the F statistic becomes non-standard 
distribution. Hansen (1996) showed that a bootstrap procedure attains the first-order asymptotic distribution, so 
p-values constructed from the bootstrap are asymptotically valid. Treat the regressors itx  and threshold 
variable itd  as given, holding their values fixed in repeated bootstrap samples. Take the regression residuals
*ˆ
ite , 
and group them by individual: )ˆ,,ˆ,ˆ(ˆ 21
* ∗∗∗= iTiii eeee L . Treat the sample { }∗∗∗ neee ˆ,ˆ,ˆ 21 L  as the empirical 
distribution to be used for bootstrapping. Draw a sample of size n from the empirical distribution and use these 
errors to create a bootstrap sample under 0H . Using the bootstrap sample, estimate the model under the null (13) 
and alternative (5) and calculate the bootstrap value of the likelihood ratio statistic )(γF (15). Repeat this 
procedure a large number of times and calculate the percentage of draws for which the simulated statistic 
exceeds the actual. This is the bootstrap estimate of the asymptotic p-value for )(γF  under 0H . The null of no 
threshold effect is rejected if the p-value is smaller than the desired critical value.  
  ))()(
~
( ζγγ FFPP >=                                          (16) 
whereζ  is the conditional mean of ( ) ( )γγ FF >~ . 
 
2.4 Asymptotic distribution of threshold estimate 
Chan (1993) and Hansen (1999) showed that when there is a threshold effect 1 2α α≠ , γˆ  is consistent for 0γ , 
and that the asymptotic distribution is highly non-standard. Hansen (1999) argued that the best way to form 
confidence intervals for γ  is to form the ‘no-rejection region’ using the likelihood ratio statistic for tests onγ . 
To test the hypothesis  
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We construct the testing model:  
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Hansen (1999) pointed out that when )( 01 γLR  is too large and the p-value exceeds the confidence 
interval, the null hypothesis is rejected1. Besides, Hansen (1999) indicated that under some specific assumptions2 
and 00 : γγ =H , 
ζγ dLR =)(1                                                     (18) 
as ∞→n , where ζ  is a random variable with distribution function 
  
2))
2
exp(1()( xxP −−=≤ζ                                      (19) 
The asymptotic p-value can be estimated under the likelihood ratio. According to the proof of 
Hansen(1999), the distribution function (18) has the inverse  
                                                 
1 Note that the statistic (17) is testing a different hypothesis from the statistic (15) introduced in the previous section. 
)( 01 γLR is testing 00 : γγ =H  while )(γF is testing 210 : αα =H . 
2 Refer to Hansen (1999) Appendix: Assumptions 1-8. 
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  )11log(2)( αα −−−=c                                        (20)  
from which it is easy to calculate critical values. For a given asymptotic level α , the null hypothesis 0γγ =  
rejects if )(1 γLR exceeds )(αc . 
 
2.5 Multiple thresholds Model 
If there exist double thresholds, the model is modified as: 
  
'
1 1
'
2 1 2
'
3 2
i it it it it
it i it it it it
i it it it it
h d if d
v h d if d
h d if d
µ θ α ε γ
µ θ α ε γ γ
µ θ α ε γ
 + + + ≤

= + + + < ≤

+ + + ≤
                          (21) 
where threshold value 21 γγ < . This can be extended to multiple thresholds model （ nγγγγ L,,, 321 ）. 
Empirical Results 
This paper applies the threshold theory proposed by Hansen (1999) and assumes that debt ratio and corporate 
performance have asymmetric nonlinear relationship. First we test if there exists threshold effect. We test double 
threshold and single threshold effect, respectively, and the formulas for both models are as follows: 
'
1 1
'
2 1 2
'
3 2
i it it it it
it i it it it it
i it it it it
h d if d
v h d if d
h d if d
µ θ α ε γ
µ θ α ε γ γ
µ θ α ε γ
 + + + ≤

= + + + < ≤

+ + + ≤
                      
'
1
'
2
i it it it it
it
i it it it it
h d if d
v
h d if d
µ θ α ε γ
µ θ α ε γ
 + + + ≤
= 
+ + + >
 
The dependent variable itv  represents corporate performance or firm value, which uses ROA, ROE, 
EPS, and Tobin’s q as proxies, respectively. The independent variable itd  represents debt ratio (D/TA ratio), 
which is indeed the threshold variable. ith  is a control variable vector that contains four variables of dividend 
payout ratio, management ownership ratio, growth rate of total assets, and switch-out investment ratio. 
Besides, iµ , the fixed effect, represents the heterogeneity of companies under different operating conditions. The 
errors itε  is assumed to be independent and identically distributed with mean zero and finite 
variance
2σ ( 2~ (0, )it iidε σ ). i and t are symbols for firms and time periods. 
This paper follows the bootstrap method to get the approximation of F statistic and then calculate the p-
value. Table 1 presents the empirical results of test for both single threshold and double threshold effects. After 
repeating bootstrap procedure 200 times for each of the two panel threshold tests, we find that the tests for 
double threshold are all statistically insignificant for any of the dependent variables-ROA, ROE, EPS, or Tobin’s 
q served as the proxy variable of the firm value. However, the significant finding at the 10% level with a 
bootstrap p-value of 0.06 occurs only when Tobin’s q is selected as the proxy for firm value in the testing of 
single threshold. We thus conclude that there exists a single threshold effect of the debt ratio on firm value when 
Tobin’s q is selected. For the remainder of the analysis we work with this single threshold model.  
Table 1  Tests for threshold effects between the debt ratio and proxy variables of the firm value  
 Single threshold effect test Double threshold effect test 
Firm Value 
Variables 
Threshold -
value 
F P-value Threshold-value F P-value 
ROA 41.12 2.01 0.98 41.12 44.18 5.23 0.35 
ROE 41.12 2.70 0.94 38.43 44.12 2.10 0.94 
EPS 41.12 3.16 0.84 41.12 44.18 3.02 0.79 
Tobin’s q 37.84 12.40 0.06
*
 32.99 37.84 4.75 0.50 
notes: 1. F Statistic and  P-value result from repeating bootstrap procedure 200 times for each of the two 
bootstrap tests.  
2. The symbol ***, **, and *, represent the significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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When there exists a single threshold effect of the debt ratio on firm value, all observations are split into 
two regimes, a low debt level and a high debt level, depending on whether the threshold variable itd  is smaller 
or larger than the threshold value (γ ). The regimes are distinguished by differing regression slopes, 1α  and 2α . 
Table 2 represents the regression slope estimates together with the conventional OLS standard errors and White-
corrected standard errors for two regimes. 
Table 2  Estimated Coefficients for Each Proxy Variable of the Firm Value 
 Coefficients  Estimated Value OLS se White se 
ROA 
1αˆ  0.0290 0.0667 0.0754 
2αˆ  -0.0126 0.0440 0.0495 
ROE 
1αˆ  0.0557 0.1530 0.1498 
2αˆ  -0.0548 0.1010 0.1046 
EPS 
1αˆ  0.0190 0.0237 0.0278 
2αˆ  0.0005 0.0157 0.0184 
Tobin’s q 
1αˆ  0.1848
* 0.0963 0.0690 
2αˆ  0.0319 0.0624 0.0339 
notes: 1. 1αˆ and 2αˆ represent coefficient estimate that smaller and larger than threshold valueγ . 
      2. The symbol ***, **, and *, represent the significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
The estimated model from above empirical findings can be expressed as follows: 
( )
( )
( )
( )
0.0963 0.0624
ˆ ˆ0.1848 0.0319it i it it it it itv u d I d d dγ γ ε= + ≤ + > +  
The estimated threshold value (γ ) is 37.84%, and thus all of the observations can be divided into two 
regimes depending on whether the D/TA ratio is smaller or larger than the threshold value. Two coefficients 
(
1α = 0.1848 and 2α = 0.0319) are all positive with the evidence that the 1α  in the low debt level is significant, 
while the 
2α  in the high debt level is not. 
Under the situation without considering threshold effect, from Table 2 we still can find the asymmetric 
nonlinear relationships between debt ratio and corporate performance, when ROA and ROE are selected as the 
proxy variables (ROA: 
1α = 0.0290, 2α = -0.0126; ROE: 1α = 0.0557, 2α = -0.0548). In both cases, the 
coefficient estimates of
1α (at the first regime) are positive; and 2α (at the second regime) are negative. These 
results are consistent with the trade-off theory, for which we may search a “balance” that the interest tax shield is 
equal to the incremental costs through debt financing. 
This paper further investigates the influences of four control variables upon the firm value. The 
empirical results are observed in Table 3, which shows that only switch-out investment ratio when ROA is 
selected as the proxy for firm value has significant negative impact on firm value. Among the findings when 
ROE and EPS are selected as proxy, no apparent relationships between all of the four control variables and firm 
value are observed. Finally, dividend payout ratio is shown to have significant negative relationship with the 
firm value when Tobin’s q is selected as the proxy for firm value. 
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Table 3 Estimation of Coefficients of Control Variables 
Firm Value Coefficients Estimated Value OLS se White se 
ROA 
1
θˆ  -0.7720 0.3642 0.7265 
2
θˆ  0.8246 0.8093 0.4658 
3
θˆ  -5.7917
* 3.3336 2.6767 
4
θˆ  -0.0003 0.0142 0.0177 
ROE 
1
θˆ  -1.2211 0.8359 1.1563 
2
θˆ  1.0069 1.8576 0.7553 
3
θˆ  -12.0659 7.6515 5.5795 
4
θˆ  0.0166 0.0326 0.0446 
EPS 
1
θˆ  -0.2890 0.1297 0.2592 
2
θˆ  0.1882 0.2882 0.1530 
3
θˆ  -1.9156 1.1869 0.8986 
4
θˆ  0.0026 0.0051 0.0065 
Tobin’s q 
1
θˆ  -0.8117
* 0.5158 0.3850 
2
θˆ  0.4806 1.1470 0.3832 
3
θˆ  3.0801 4.7062 3.0595 
4
θˆ  -0.0080 0.0201 0.0113 
notes: 1.
1
θˆ 、
2
θˆ 、
3
θˆ 及
4
θˆ represent the estimated coefficients: stock dividend per share, management ownership 
ratio, long-term investment ratio, and growth rate of total assets. 
     2. The symbol ***, **, and *, represent the significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Conclusion 
There are two major different capital structure theories: the Trade-off and Pecking Order theory. The Trade-off 
theory suggested that value-maximizing financial managers should employ capital structures for which the 
interest tax shield is equal to the incremental costs through debt financing. In other words, finds the “optimal 
debt ratios”. The pecking Order theory, on the other hand, argued that high-profitable firms prefer internal 
financing from external. Therefore, the purpose of this paper intends to test if there exists an optimal debt ratio; 
and explores whether application of financial leverage affects corporate performance or firm value of listed firms 
in Tehran stock exchange.  The optimal debt ratio is found through using newly developed threshold regression 
model proposed by Hansen (1999). We found out that there exists a single “threshold” of optimal debt usage, 
which is equal to the trade-off between the benefits of more debts to increase the firm value versus the costs of 
additional debts that may   deteriorate the corporate performance or value. The results of this paper are more 
consistent with the theoretical background of M&M’s model (1963), Myers (1977), and Ross (1977) as 
presented in the first section of this paper.  In contrast with traditional linear model, nonlinear relationship 
between variables is investigated in this study. We found out there exists single threshold effect between debt 
ratio and firm value only when Tobing’s q is selected as the proxy variable for the firm value. The estimated 
threshold value (γ ) is 37.84%, while all of the observations can be divided into two regimes, a low debt level 
and a high debt level, depending on whether the D/TA ratio is smaller or larger than the specific threshold value. 
Two coefficients (
1α and 2α ) are all positive with the evidence that the 1α  in the low debt level is significant, 
while the 
2α  in the high debt level is not. However, the positive effect decreases when debt ratio increases. This 
may be explained that following with the interest tax shield increases; on the other side, leverage-related costs 
increase to counteract the positive effect of debt ratio to the firm value. This suggests that the financial managers 
should take steps to increase debt levels when the current debt percentage of total assets is below the threshold 
value of 37.84％; conversely, they should take steps to lower debt levels when the current debt usage is higher 
than the threshold value of 37.84％, for there is no further apparent net benefit due to the incremental leverage-
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related costs in the future. Under the situation without considering threshold effect, we still can find the 
asymmetric nonlinear relationships between debt ratio and corporate performance, when ROA and ROE are 
selected as the proxy variables. In both cases, the coefficient estimates of
1α  are positive and 2α are negative. 
These results are consistent with the trade-off theory, for which we may search a “balance” that the interest tax 
shield is offset by the incremental costs through debt financing. The empirical results of testing for the influences 
of four control variables upon the firm value indicate that only switch-out investment ratio when ROA is selected 
as the proxy for firm value has significant negative impact on firm value. Among the findings when ROE and 
EPS are selected as proxy, no apparent relationships between all of the four control variables and firm value are 
observed. Finally, dividend payout ratio is shown to have significant negative relationship with the firm value 
when Tobin’s q is selected as the proxy for firm value.  
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